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NOTES
ROLE OF REMEDIAL DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE OF
AD HOC RULE MAKING
The development of administrative law is a natural concomitant of
a modern, complex society. judicial enforcement of legislative acts no
longer provides an exclusive solution to national problems. Congress has
neither the time nor the technical knowledge to delve into the complexi-
ties of socio-industrial problems and to legislate a detailed solution.'
Congress is principally a policy making body and an extreme preoccupa-
tion with details will divert its attention from more important considera-
tions. Therefore, Congress must frequently legislate by formulating
broad policies unaccompanied by detailed legal standards. Thus, of neces-
sity, legislation is often general and incomplete.
Vague legislation, however, cannot be efficiently administered by
the courts.2 Although they can interpret vague legislation to some ex-
tent by seeking meaning from legislative history or mechanical rules of
construction,' courts cannot properly adjudicate if the statute is too in-
definite for an effective use of interpretative criteria.4  The judicial
process operates by applying existing law to a particular set of facts and
enforcing the legal conclusions deduced therefrom.5 If the applicable
law is vague and uncertain, the courts cannot discharge their judicial
responsibility.
Thus, faced with the conflict between the necessity for broader leg-
islation and its resulting incompatibility with the judicial process, Con-
gress is forced to create intervening agencies to administer the details of
its "skeleton" legislation. Therefore, one of the reasons for administra-
tive law is to allow the delegation of administrative discretion to an ex-
perienced agency to clarify the statutory standards6 and to apply them in
1. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37, § 1.05 (1958).
2. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952) ; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
3. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917) ; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
4. Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, supra note 2; Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471,
56 N.E.2d 761 (1944); Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485 (1935).
5. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908) ; Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal.
194, 8 Pac. 852 (1885) ; Williams v. Norman, 85 Okla. 230, 205 Pac. 144 (1921).
6. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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a manner designed to effectuate the statutory scheme. Essentially, ad-
ministrative discretion is the power of an agency to act according to its
own expert judgment, unrestricted by pre-established rules.'
Administrative responsibility may be divided into two categories-
the duty to adjudicate controversies arising under the statute and the
duty to sub-legislate to fill in the interstices of the Act.' The exercise of
discretion in the adjudicative process is limited to a determination of
factual issues. This is not to imply that interpretation of the statutory
language is not a proper judicial function but it is important to realize
that as soon as interpretation becomes discretionary it is no longer an
adjudicative function. It involves the selection of policy and must
therefore be considered as sublegislation.' In the usual administration of
a regulatory statute the agency may be required to interpret the statutory
language. As long as this interpretation is guided by criteria other than
the administrator's discretion, it is judicial rather than administrative
interpretation. For purposes of this note and to distinguish ordinary
judicial interpretation from its more creative administrative counterpart,
an agency's discretionary interpretation of its regulatory statute in a judi-
cial proceeding will be referred to as ad hoc action. It is sub-legislative
in the sense that it is exercised in the absence of a concrete rule, yet in
form it is merely the issuance of an order based upon the agency's con-
sideration of statutory policy for a particular situation.
Generality in the language of a regulatory statute is indicative of a
Congressional intent to delegate the duty of defining the statutory stand-
ards to the agencies instructed to effectuate the statute."' Since Congress
cannot always specify its intent in advance, it deliberately employs vague
language at critical points in the statute and leaves the definition of these
standards to be worked out by the agencies. Vague language, such as
"due care" or "detrimental to the public interest," has a wide range of
possible meanings. Thus when an agency decides that exclusive con-
tracts are an "unfair method of competition," the interpretation is ac-
tually a sub-legislative choice of policy." Norton v. TVarner" illustrates
7. Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization and
Procedures, 36 IND. L.J. 1 (1960). Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of
Discretion, 47 YALE L.J. 577 (1938).
S. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(g), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(195S).
9. NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson, 195 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1952).
10. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402 (1941) ; Supreme Court Evaluation of Administrative Determinations of Law,
56 HARV. L. REv. 100, 111 (1942).
11. FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
12. 321 U.S. 565 (1944).
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that ad hoc action depends upon the administrator's possession of sub-
legislative authority. 3 In that case a reviewing court reversed an ad-
ministrator's compensation award as being based upon an improper in-
terpretation of the regulatory statute. The validity of the award de-
pended upon whether an employee was a "master or member of a crew
of any vessel." If the employee came within this definition he would
be excluded from the coverage of the statute and denied compensation.
The Deputy Commissioner interpreted this language as being inapplicable
to a boatman on a barge and the employee was permitted to recover com-
pensation for an injury received in the course of his employment. The
reviewing court refused to sustain this award because it disagreed with
the commissioner's interpretation of the statute. If the commissioner
had possessed interpretative discretion as well as the discretion to find
the facts the court could not have disagreed with his decision. Under
section 927 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act,'" however, the Deputy Commissioner merely has a quasi-judicial
authority 5 and he does not have the sub-legislative discretion to interpret
the statute in such a way as to preclude judicial review.
Ordinarily sub-legislative authority is to be exercised prospectively
through the promulgation of substantive rules. Clarification of the reg-
ulatory statute by rule making gives the parties affected by such rules the
benefit of advance notice. But rule making is not always an appropriate
procedure because regulatory agencies must administer broad policies,
parts of which may contain no specific guides to action, and it is pre-
ferable that they explore their subjects carefully and advance conclusions
tentatively, on a contingent basis."8 Consequently agency action must be
flexible enough to deal with unanticipated problems as they arise in con-
crete situations. Under these circumstances an agency may prefer to
proceed by ad hoc interpretations rather than by rule making." Rule
making involves the immediate creation of a comprehensive regulation so
it is too rigid and inflexible to solve new problems which are incapable of
13. Nowlin, Ad Hoc Action By Administrative Agencies, 2 ARK. L.R. 439 (1947-48).
This article indicates that ad hoc action is possible only by administrative agencies
possessing both quasi legislative and quasi judicial authority.
14. Longshoremens and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1438, § 27
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 927 (1958).
15. Woodfield Fish and Oyster Co. v. Wilde, 124 F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1953);
See Longshoremens and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, supra note 14.
16. Board of Investigation and Research, Report on Practices and Procedures of
Governmental Control, H.R. Doc. No. 678, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. 80, 81 (1944).
17. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953) ; SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947); American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
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being captured within the boundaries of a general rule.' If an agency
does not have enough familiarity with a particular problem to solve it by
rule making, it may not be able to postpone its regulation until it does
acquire sufficient experience to promulgate a general rule. The absence
of relevant standards in a case of first impression does not relieve the
agency of its responsibility to effectuate the statutory scheme. 9  At
times, the agency may be required to resort to ad hoc interpretations to
provide the necessary standards.
Ad hoc action satisfies the need for a case to case development of
policy because it reacts to unique problems as they arise and every inter-
pretation clarifies the statute to some extent. It permits statutory policy
to evolve cautiously and the principles so established can be tested by
their practical results. Although ad hoc action clarifies the regulatory
statute retroactively it nevertheless supplies essential flexibility to ad-
ministrative procedure.
It is important to distinguish ad hoc action from judicial interpre-
tation because each procedure has a different legal effect. The latter is
subject to judicial review and can easily be upset if the court disagrees
with its statement of the law.2" Ad hoc action is within the area of
agency discretion, however, and can be invalidated only if it is not au-
thorized by the statute or is so unreasonable as to be an abuse of discre-
tion.21 This distinction can be emphasized in terms of legal outcome by
an analysis of the history of Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chen-
cry Corporation.2 In that case the commission was required to judge
the validity of a proposed reorganization plan in accordance with the
standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.22 The
case involved a reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation
and while the proposed plans were awaiting Commission approval, the
officers purchased a substantial amount of the corporation's preferred
stock. One of the plans considered by the Commission provided for the
conversion of preferred stock into common stock and if this plan were
unconditionally approved, the officers of Federal would have retained
control of the reorganized corporation through their purchases of pre-
18. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 17 at 202, 203; Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
29, 30 (1941).
19. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 17.
20. Norton v. Warner, 321 U.S. 565 (1944).
21. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 17 at 207; Mastrapasquce v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
22. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
23. 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(a) (1958).
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ferred stock. Under the- Commission's interpretation of the statutory
standards, the stock purchases by the officers would not be "fair and
equitable to the persons affected thereby" within the meaning of section
11 (e), and would be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of
investors" contrary to sections 6, 7(d) and 7(e) of the Act. The Com-
mission ordered the officers to dispose of the newly purchased stock and
justified its interpretation by citing judicial precedents which it errone-
ously believed supported the principle denying insiders the right to deal
in corporate securities during reorganization. This was a judicial in-
terpretation of the statute because the Commission purported to define the
standards by external criteria rather than by its own independent judg-
ment of statutory requirements. The Supreme Court refused to sustain
the order because the judicial authority cited was inapplicable to the
Chenery situation.24
The case was remanded for reconsideration and the Supreme Court
suggested that the agency look to its statutory powers to establish an ap-
propriate rationale. Thereafter the Commission abandoned any attempt
at judicial interpretation and exercised its sub-legislative authority to re-
formulate its prior ruling. The second order was clearly based upon the
Commission's independent judgment of statutory policy and a divided
court upheld the order as a proper exercise of discretion. In effect, the
Commission's second order was based upon a discretionary interpretation
of the statute which created a new substantive rule, retroactively binding
the corporate officers.
Within limits, the possession of interpretative discretion permits an
agency to "create" the law it will apply in the decision of a case. The
agency does not actually legislate new law but when it interprets language
such as "fair and equitable" as prohibiting management stock transac-
tions during a reorganization the impact of such an interpretation may
be indistinguishable from retroactive legislation. Before such retroactiv-
ity can be properly analyzed, however, it is necessary to examine the ef-
fect of an agency's remedial discretion on the exercise of ad hoc action.
The responsibility of regulatory agencies to administer their statutes
includes the duty to issue remedial orders to effectuate the statutory
scheme. Agencies have a wide discretion in the selection of their rem-
edies and it is not necessary that the powers exercised be expressly
authorized by a statute.25 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB ' is perhaps the
24. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
25. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Inland Waterways Corp.
v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940); ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 287 U.S. 178
(1932) ; Shawnut Ass'n. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1945).
26. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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most extreme case establishing this principle. In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld an order of the Labor Board requiring an employer to hire
men who had been refused employment because they were union mem-
bers. The NLRA authorizes the Board to take affirmative action when-
ever an unfair labor practice occurs, including reinstatement of employees
who have been discriminatorily discharged.27 However, the Act con-
tains no express provision authorizing instatement of employees who
have been refused employment. The Supreme Court analogized dis-
criminatory hiring to discriminatory firing and held that a remedy of
instatement should be implied from the express authorization of re-
instatement. Both remedies are designed to correct the effects of a spe-
cific unfair labor practice and would therefore effectuate the policies of
the Act. The two are not analogous remedies, however, and they raise
different constitutional questions. Reinstatement involves the enforce-
ment of a personal services contract while instatement compels the execu-
tion of such a contract. Compelling an employer to hire someone he
might not want to employ is more extreme than compelling him to retain
an employee he had originally hired. Insofar as reinstatement is con-
cerned, constitutional doubts are removed by the statutory language that
clearly authorizes the agency to go tlis far in the formulation of its
remedial orders. But there is no express authorization for instatement
and, by approving the agency's remedial order in the face of serious con-
stitutional objections, the Supreme Court has given administrative agen-
cies complete freedom in the selection of their remedies so long as that
relief effectuates the policies of the Act.
Remedial orders may be divided into four categories, according to
the severity of their requirements: (1) Declaratory judgments and ad-
visory opinions merely clarify the law without immediately imposing
personal obligations; (2) cease and desist orders do impose personal obli-
gations but their effect is prospective since they are not enforced until
they are violated in some future instance; (3) corrective orders impose
affirmative duties on the regulated parties to restore the status quo as it
existed at the time of the violation; (4) compensatory orders generally
require the payment of money to provide for the interim period between
the occurrence of a violation and its correction by a corrective order.
Corrective and compensatory orders may appear to be punitive to the
regulated parties" but they are justified as remedies designed to correct
27. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c),
(1958).
28. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour
Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1941).
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statutofy violations. However, the dtities which an order impose must
bear some reasonable relationship to the statutory purpose.2" If the re-
quirements of a remedial order go beyond that purpose the order may
well be invalidated as a penalty. °
For example, Wong Wing v. United States31 involved an Act of
Congress designed to exclude Chinese aliens. The Act required that such
aliens illegally in the country be imprisoned at hard labor for a period not
exceeding one year. The Act contained no provisions for a judicial trial.
The argument was advanced that due process did not require a judicial
trial because the authority to imprison aliens at hard labor was a remedial
rather than a punitive power. The Supreme Court, however, held that
the provisions were penalties and that the immigration officials could not
subject aliens to such extreme treatment without an indictment and jury
trial. Although a temporary detention is remedial in the sense that it is
a necessary part of exclusion proceedings,32 it is clear that the provisions
for imprisonment at hard labor go beyond this purpose and are definitely
punitive.
On the other hand, if the remedial order corrects a specific viola-
tion, the mere fact that it incidentally penalizes the regulated party does
not invalidate it. Thus in L. P. Stewart v. Bowles33 an OPA suspension
order directed against a dealer who had intentionally violated the ration-
ing standards was upheld by the United States Supreme Court as a proper
exercise of the agency's power to "allocate" war scarce resources. The
Court considered the suspension order as relevant to the conservation of
fuel oil because it protected against the inequitable and inefficient distri-
bution through illegal transactions. Suspension orders have also been
sustained in cases of negligent violations34 on the theory that a negligent
disturbance of the rationing system also endangers society. A suspen-
sion order merely reallocates the scarce materials away from inefficient
dealers.
Agency orders, however, will be invalidated if they only punish a
29. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 17; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra
note 25.
30. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) ; NLRB v. U.S. Steel Corp.
and Local Union 542, 278 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1960).
31. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
32. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U.S. 161 (1904); Moraitis v. Delaney, 46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942); United
States ex.rel Schlimm v. Howe, 222 Fed. 96 (S.D. N.Y. 1915).
33. 322 U.S. 398 (1944), m pra note 17.
34. Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F.2d 730, (5th Cir. 1944); Williams v. Bowles, 61 F.
Supp. 275 (D.C. Fla. 1945).
NOTES
person without a corresponding effectuation of the regulatory statute. 5
In Sims v. Talbert8 the federal district court of South Carolina held that
the OPA could not issue a suspension order against a dealer who had
neither negligently nor criminally violated the rationing laws. In that
case an employee of the regulated dealer illegally sold gasoline without
his employer's knowledge or consent. In reversing the suspension order
the court emphasized its penal aspects and held that, since the dealer
himself was innocent of any misconduct, "the allocation of gasoline is
not affected in the slightest by the order." The suspension order merely
punished the dealer for the misconduct of his employee. Thus, the re-
quirement of effectuating statutory policy is an effective limitation on the
exercise of remedial discretion as well as a congressional mandate to take
the proper curative action in appropriate cases.
Since ad hoc action involves an element of retroactivity, courts
will be reluctant to support the action in cases where it operates oppres-
sively." However, administrative agencies can alleviate the onerous
effects of such retroactivity by tempering the severity of their remedial
orders. The ability of an agency to implement its regulatory statute
on a case by case basis may depend upon the remedy the agency selects
to effectuate its determinations." It is the consequences of the adjudi-
cation that poses the problem of retroactivity-not the adjudication
itself. If the agency merely issues a cease and desist order, warning
the party against future violations, the remedy operates no more oppres-
sively than does ordinary rule maling, because enforcement is postponed
until the mandate is transgressed in some future instance. In NLRB
v. Guy F. Atkinson, 3" the court refused to enforce an order of rein-
35. In speaking of a remedy selected by the NLRB, the Supreme Court stated,
"We give considerable weight to that administrative determination. It should stand
unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those
which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." Virginia Electric Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
36. 52 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. S.C. 1943).
37. NLRB v. E&B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 41, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955).
38. NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson, 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) (Reviewing Court
refused to enforce an order of reinstatement which was based on a retroactive application
of a new policy. However, the court specifically excepted a prospective cease and desist
order from its decision denying enforcement of the Board's order) ; NLRB v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1944) (Court approved of an order for back pay which
was limited to begin from the day the agency notified the employer that it would assert
jurisdiction over his business operations).
39. 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). Employer and union executed a closed shop con-
tract prior to the Taft Hartley prohibition of such contracts and at a time when the
NLRB was refusing to assert jurisdiction over the industry in which the employer was
engaged. The employer discharged an employee in accordance with the terms of this
contract and was subsequently charged with an unfair labor practice. The closed shop
provisions would have been valid and the collective bargaining contract would have
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statement where a new policy was retroactively applied in such a way
as to convert previously innocent conduct into an unfair labor practice.
But the court expressly excepted those portions of the order which
operated prospectively, specifically approving the cease and desist order.
Although a cease and desist order is as innocuous as a formally
promulgated rule, it is distinguishable from the latter in that its mandate
is limited to a particular situation. Insofar as the content of a cease
and desist order affects the public generally it does so merely in terms
of precedent and stare decisis. This is an important consideration when
a regulatory agency is choosing the appropriate legal procedure to
regulate a specific problem. The agency may prefer to clarify its
regulatory statute by ad hoc adjudications rather than by formal rule
making because precedents may be used more flexibly in future adjudi-
cations. It was for this reason that the Commission in the Chenwry
case elected to create an ad hoc rule rather than promulgate a general
regulation. The Commission was unwilling to establish a rigid rule
specifying when corporation officers can or cannot deal in corporate
securities during a reorganization. The agency felt that, without
flexibility, a general rule to that effect might operate unfairly in some
situations.4" Thus, ad hoc action is a particularly useful method of
developing statutory policy because the principle so established may be
limited to the facts of a particular case and a collection of ad hoc
interpretations may eventually supply the background for the promul-
gation of a general rule.4
If the agency's remedy is more extreme than a cease and desist
order, however, a retroactive interpretation of the statute has less chance
of success.42 A corrective or compensatory order can be combined with
an ad hoc interpretation and retroactively enforced against the regulated
constituted a defense if it had been executed with the representative of the employees
of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Board attempted to assert jurisdiction retro-
actively and held that the contract did not represent an appropriate bargaining unit. The
employer was deprived of his defense and the Board found him guilty of discriminatory
hiring practices. The Board ordered the employee reinstated and further directed the
employer to cease and desist from such hiring practices. The Court held that the
retroactive reversal of policy was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and
invalidated all retroactive aspects of the agency's order, excepting only the cease
and desist order.
40. Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 154 F.2d 6, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
41. Nowlin, Ad Hoc Action By Administrative Ageicies, 2 ARK. L.R. 439, 496
(1948).
42. NLRB v. E&B Brewing Co., supra note 37; NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson, supra
note 38.
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parties only where it is necessary to effectuate the regulatory statute.43
In the Chenery case the Commission was instructed to approve or
disapprove proposed reorganization plans upon such conditions as were
consistent with statutory policy. Thus, the Commission was permitted
to interpret the "fair and equitable" language of section 11 (e) of
the Act as prohibiting the particular stock transactions in the cir-
cumstances of a reorganization. A cease and desist order would have
modified the effects of this retroactive interpretation but it would
not have been an appropriate order because the Commission would not
have properly discharged its statutory responsibility if it had not con-
ditioned its approval of the proposed plan. In that case, the Supreme
Court established a test for the validity of ad hoc interpretations. "Such
retroactivity must be balanced agains the mischif of producing a
result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable
principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effects of the retro-
active application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity
which is condemned by law."4 ' Because of their retroactivity, ad hoc
orders which impose affirmative duties on the regulated parties will
be enforced only where the public benefit of such enforcement will
outweigh the private harm resulting therefrom.
In applying this test, courts do not have any preconceived notions
as to the quality of harm which will invalidate agency action. Each
case is decided by its own particular equities and a variety of external
factors may have a persuasive influence on the courts. Thus, a review-
ing court may properly consider such factors as (1) The kind of agency
involved and the nature of its duties, (2) The severity of the order
issued and its relationship to the particular facts, (3) The extent of
reliance on a previous policy. In a close case, the courts may also be
influenced by considerations of good or bad faith.4" An analysis
of the situations in which retroactivity has been permitted or denied will
provide a more enlightened approach to the effective use of ad hoc
action."
43. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 29; Leedom v. IBEW, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C.
Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Pierce Bros., 206
F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1953).
44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., Yupra note 29 at 203.
45. Compare NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951) (reviewing court did not
condemn the Labor Board's retroactive withdrawal from previous procedures where
an employer relied on those procedures as a shield for unfair labor practices) ; NLRB
v. Guy F. Atkinson, 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) and NLRB v. E&B Brewing Co., 276
F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960) (reviewing courts would not permit a retroactive amendment
of policy which converted previously innocent conduct into unfair labor practices).
46. Not all of the cases to be discussed involve an exercise of ad hoc action in
the sense that a new standard is created by an administrative interpretation and simul-
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It is important to distinguish the situations in which an administra-
tive agency merely clarifies existing law from those cases where an
agency has retroactively departed from a previously announced policy.
In the first case the agency is not troubled by the fact that the regulated
parties may have relied on a previous policy and taken action in ac-
cordance with it. Courts generally permit the retroactive clarification
of uncertain law , because the principle of judicial consistency is not
violated. Where the retroactivity affects a previous policy, however,
there is an additional element of reliance to be considered and courts
will not permit the retroactive amendment or withdrawal from that
policy if particular parties will be prejudiced by their reliance thereon."I
The case of NLRB v. Pedersen" is an example of an extreme sort of
reliance. In that case, the Labor Board subjoenaed Pedersen to testify
against his employer concerning alleged unfair labor practices. Sub-
sequently, Pedersen was discharged as a consequence of his testimony
and he filed charges against his employer. The trial examiner, finding that
the discharge violated Section 8(a) (4) of the Act, recommended that
Pedersen be reinstated with back pay. However, the Board announced
new jurisdictional standards before considering the trial examiner's re-
commendations and dismissed Pedersen's case in accordance with its
newly adopted policy. The reviewing court condemned the retroactive
application of the new jurisdictional criteria and required the Board
to accept the case for to hold otherwise would be, in effect, compelling
Pedersen to testify under one jurisdictional policy and retroactively
withdrawing his protection under a new set of standards.
It also appears that in cases where the parties were particularly
justified in relying on a specific agency policy, the courts will not
permit the agency to abandon that policy retroactively to the detriment
taneously applied in the adjudication of a case. Many of the cases merely involve the
application of a new policy retroactively. However, it is the element of retroactivity
that makes ad hoc action undesirable so a consideration of these cases is relevant to
this note.
47. 2 DAvis, ADMUINISTRATIvE LAW § 17.09 (1958). Compare SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
supra note 29 (retroactive clarification of uncertain law) ; FTC v. Motion Picture Adv.
Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) (retroactive clarification of uncertain law), and NLRB v.
E&B Brewing Co., supra note 45 (retroactive change of settled law).
48. NLRB v. E&B Brewing Co., sapra note 45; NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson, supra
note 45; NLRB v. Pedersen, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Braukman, 94
NLRB ANN. REP. 1609 (1951).
49. 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956).
50. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . . to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testi-
mony under this Act." National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (4), 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(4) (1958).
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of the relying parties. 1  Thus in NLRB v. Braukman, 5 2 the Labor
Board refused to adopt new jurisdictional standards retroactively where
such retroactivity would entrap an employer who had acted in reliance
on the Board's previously expressed refusal to exercise jurisdiction over
the particular employer's enterprise.
The case of NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., involving essentially
similar issues, illustrates how an agency can adopt a new policy retro-
actively and condition its remedial order in such a way as to prevent
its action from being invalidated as an abuse of discretion. In that
case, the Labor Board had initially refused to assert jurisdiction over
a locally operated transit company in a 1937 proceeding. In effect,
this decision informed the employer that his operations were not within
the coverage of the Act. Subsequently, the Transit Company estab-
lished relationship with a company dominated union and discharged
several employees who had attempted to organize an outside union. In
1942, the Board notified the Transit Company that it had abandoned
its 1937 jurisdictional policy. The illegal practices continued, however,
and the discharged employees filed charges against the employer. The
Board found that the relationship between the company and the union
and the discriminatory discharges were unfair labor practices and the
Board took affirmative remedial action. Although a portion of the
order operated retroactively in that it directed the disestablishment of
the company union and the reinstatement of the employees, the Board
conditioned its compensatory orders to operate prospectively by limiting
the awards of dues reimbursement and back pay to begin only from
the time the company had been notified of the Board's amendment of
jurisdictional policy.
If the reliance is not particularly justified, however, courts will
sustain a retroactive amendment of earlier policy if that will effectuate
the statutory scheme. In NLRB v. Nobritz5 4 an employer was charged
with the commission of unfair labor practices. He attempted to have
the case dismissed on the ground that any regulation of his labor policies
would be retroactive since the Board had previously refused to exercise
jurisdiction in similar cases. The Board rejected this argument and
was sustained on appeal. The employer was not justified in assuming
that the Board's policy of refusing to accept cases of a similar nature
would also extend to his operations. The agency had not formulated
51. NLR'B v. Braukman, supra note 48; NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d
51 (4th Cir. 1944).
52. 94 NLRB ANN. REP. 1609 (1951).
53. Supra note 51.
54. 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951).
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definite jurisdictional standards nor had the employer received any
assurance that his enterprise was not within the coverage of the Act,
as was the case with Braukinan and Baltimore Transit. The Board
properly precluded the employer from generalizing a policy from isolated
agency action and using this presumed policy as a defense for statutory
violations.
Notwithstanding the unfairness of a retroactive amendment of
policy, administrators may be required to adjust agency policies by
ad hoc in order to maintain the flexibility of administrative procedure.
Reliance on a previous policy cannot constitute a defense if it will
restrict agency procedure unreasonably and rigidify the administrative
process." Thus, in Leedont v. IBEW58 the Labor Board was permitted
to change its contract bar rules retroactively and apply the new rules
to contracts which had been formed in reliance on the earlier policy.
The new rules adopted by the agency reduced the contract bar term
from five years to two years. The court, finding that the agency was
required to adjust its contract bar rules periodically in order to perform
its statutory duties, justified the retroactive reversal of policy. If the
new rules could not have been established retroactively, the Board would
have been required to postpone their operation for five years, until all
of the contracts created in reliance on the old rules had expired, or,
alternatively, the agency would have been required to administer both
sets of rules simultaneously. Neither alternative was satisfactory for
an efficient administration of the statute. The postponement of the
new rules for five years would have rigidified agency procedure and
the simultaneous application of both sets of rules would have created
an "administrative monstrosity"" which would have impaired the
agency's efficiency. Against this kind of necessity the reviewing court
weighed the relative harm of the retroactivity and held that the balance
favored the agency action.
Although it has been severely criticized,5" ad hoc action represents
55. Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Atlas
Tack Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 246 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957); NLRB v. National
Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. Grace, 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.
1950).
56. 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
57. Supra note 56 at 242.
58. Justice Jackson's strong dissent in the Chenery case:
It [ad hoc action] makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless
formality for the litigant, even where granted to him by Congress. It reduces
the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint. While the opinion does not
have the adherence of a majority of the full Court, if its pronouncements should
become governing principles they would, in practice, put most administrative
orders over and above the law. 322 U.S. 194 at 210.
Editorial in the Washington Post, October 8, 1947, p. 14, col. 2:
NOTES
a natural development of administrative law, where agencies possess
both quasi legislative and quasi judicial authority. There is no inherent
contradiction involved in the use of sub-legislative discretion to interpret
statutory standards in aid of an adjudication. As long as the courts
remain as solicitous of individual rights as they have been in the past
and seriously insist upon the observance of due process, there is little
danger that ad hoc action will get out of control. It is true, as Justice
Jackson noted in his Chenery dissent, that ad hoc action places the pro-
priety of the rule beyond judicial review. But the courts can still in-
validate the action if it is unreasonable or if it inflicts injury out of
proportion to its public value. Despite its retroactivity, if the remedial
aspect is appropriately conditioned to effectuate a statutory scheme, ad
hoc action may be a valuable instrument of administrative procedure.
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
A NEW DEPARTURE
The Supreme Court has spoken on agricultural cooperative activity
and the antitrust laws in a case that is representative of the conflict be-
tween congressional policies seeking to preserve a competitive business
economy, and those seeking to obtain better returns for farmers through
the medium of collective marketing.' That case is Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n, v. United States.2
The result of the decision is an expression in unequivocal terms that
Capper-Volstead cooperatives are not privileged to engage in trade prac-
tices and methods of competition forbidden to business corporations.
This position marks a substantial departure from the Court's previous
expression in United States v. Borden Co.'
This note is an effort to analyze the Borden and laryland & Vir-
ginia cases, to determine the position of the federated cooperative in view
of the Maryland & Virginia decision, and to analyze the position of agri-
cultural cooperatives in the face of monopoly prohibitions.
Our basic idea of government is that public agencies will act in accord with
law that may be known in advance by citizens. It is difficult to read the
Court's decision in this case [Chenery] without getting the impression that,
within broad spheres of regulatory power, it now regards administrative agencies
as laws unto themselves.
1. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 28, Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
2. 362 U.S. 458. (1960).
3. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
